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Two More Problems and Too Little Money: Can Congress 
Truly Reform Forensic Science? 
Eric Maloney* 
Forensic science plays a pivotal role in today’s criminal 
justice system.1 While television crime dramas have 
popularized images of high-tech modern laboratories and 
diligent scientists that always help catch the right bad guy, 
there is a lot going on behind the scenes in real-world forensic 
labs that may actually be hindering our pursuit of proper 
justice for those who commit crimes.2 A stark illustration of 
this has emerged in two separate scandals, separated by 
several states and thousands of miles, involving misconduct 
and poor management procedure in crime labs in Minnesota 
and Massachusetts.3 Consequences have been dire; the release 
of convicted criminals, possible indefinite delays in the 
prosecution of suspects, and increased pressure on already 
strained state budgets are just small parts of the fallout.4 These 
episodes are just the latest instances of what has become a 
recurring issue in forensic science: ensuring that testing results 
used to convict criminals are accurate.5 
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 1. See COMM. ON IDENTIFYING THE NEEDS OF THE FORENSIC SCIENCE 
CMTY. ET AL., NAT’L RESEARCH COUNCIL, STRENGTHENING FORENSIC SCIENCE 
IN THE UNITED STATES: A PATH FORWARD xix–xx (2009) [hereinafter A PATH 
FORWARD]. 
 2. See infra Part I.B.1–2. 
 3. See infra Part I.B.1–2. 
 4. See infra Part I.B.3. 
 5. See infra notes 6–8 (identifying a series of proposals to ensure 
accuracy and reliability of forensic testing results). 
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Federal legislation has been slow to react to this problem. 
A 2009 report by the National Academy of Sciences (NAS), 
Strengthening Forensic Science in the United States: A Path 
Forward, (the NAS Report) took an in-depth look at the present 
state of forensic science,6 and has inspired a raft of commentary 
from judges and scholars in its attempt to illustrate the 
shortcomings in forensic disciplines.7 The most recent 
congressional attempt at improving forensic science standards 
comes in the form of a bill proposed by Senator Patrick Leahy 
called the Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act 
(the Act).8 Senator Leahy took the recommendations of the 
NAS Report and has attempted to apply them in order to 
impose significant reformation of federal regulation in this 
area.9 
The goal of this Note is to analyze how the Act would have 
improved forensic science nationwide, and whether a top-down 
approach from Congress can appropriately deal with essentially 
localized situations such as those in Minnesota and 
Massachusetts. Part I examines the current state of federal 
regulation on this issue, the NAS Report, the new legislation, 
and the reasons why misconduct has occurred and continues to 
occur in forensic laboratories. Part II then takes a critical look 
at the Act and examines where it may succeed in leading to 
true reform and where it does not, then lays out other 
regulatory reforms that may be better suited to ensuring that 
we can have confidence in the findings of our forensic 
laboratories. In the end, this Note concludes that the Act does 
make several important improvements over our current 
regulatory system, but there is still a long way to go before our 
forensic science system truly meets traditional scientific 
standards and ensures confidence in the results obtained by 
forensic professionals. 
                                                          
 6. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1. 
 7. See 4 DAVID L. FAIGMAN ET AL., MODERN SCIENTIFIC EVIDENCE: THE 
LAW AND SCIENCE OF EXPERT TESTIMONY 17 (2012) (“Judicial reaction to the 
Report . . . ranges from measured hostility to enthusiastic embrace.”). See 
generally id. § 30:10. 
 8. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132, 
112th Cong. (2011). 
 9. See infra Part I.A.4. 
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I. A HISTORY OF FRAGMENTED REGULATION AND 
PROBLEMS IN FORENSIC SCIENCE 
A. THE CURRENT STATE OF FORENSIC LABORATORIES IN THE 
UNITED STATES 
At the moment, forensic testing facilities and employees 
are largely unregulated by the federal government.10 While 
Congress set stringent standards over twenty years ago for 
clinical laboratory environments running medical tests,11 
forensic facilities have only recently been subject to federal 
oversight, and such regulation has been largely circumscribed 
to their performance of DNA analysis in light of numerous 
DNA exonerations.12 However, DNA testing is but a small 
fraction of the volume of forensic testing performed in such 
laboratories nationwide in processing evidence for use in 
criminal proceedings.13 These disciplines include, but are not 
limited to, general toxicology, firearm and tool marks, 
questioned documents, trace evidence, biological and serological 
screening, impression evidence, and controlled substance 
analysis.14 In fact, testing of suspected controlled substances 
has been a focus of forensic laboratories since the 1970s15 and 
remains the most frequent type of testing performed in labs.16 
                                                          
 10. Brandon L. Garrett & Peter J. Neufeld, Invalid Forensic Science 
Testimony and Wrongful Convictions, 95 VA. L. REV. 1, 94–95 (2009) (“[C]rime 
laboratories and forensic analysts remain remarkably free from oversight and 
still lack basic scientific standards to govern their conclusions.”). 
 11. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 263a (2006); see also Randolph N. Jonakait, Forensic Science: The Need for 
Regulation, 4 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 109, 178 (1991) (criticizing lack of regulation 
for forensic laboratories and proposing the Clinical Laboratory Improvement 
Amendments of 1988 as a model for reform). 
 12. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 10, at 93–94; see, e.g., 42 U.S.C. 
§ 14131 (2006) (establishing an advisory board on DNA quality assurance 
methods under the purview of the FBI); § 14132 (b)(2), (c) (requiring labs to be 
externally accredited and undergo bi-annual audits or risk losing access to 
national DNA databases); § 14135 (b), (d) (requiring labs to meet § 14132 
standards in order to be eligible for grants). 
 13. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 10, at 95. 
 14. Some types of forensic testing also take place outside of the 
laboratory, such as lifting latent fingerprints, digital evidence, and other types 
of crime scene investigation. NAT’L INST. OF JUSTICE, STATUS AND NEEDS OF 
FORENSIC SCIENCE SERVICE PROVIDERS: A REPORT TO CONGRESS 2 (2006), 
available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/nij/213420.pdf. 
 15. Joseph L. Peterson & Anna S. Leggett, The Evolution of Forensic 
Science: Progress Amid the Pitfalls, 36 STETSON L. REV. 621, 624 (2007). 
 16. Eighty-two percent of publicly funded forensic labs processed 
controlled substance evidence; only fifty-nine percent performed forensic 
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The expansive use of forensic testing methods outside of 
DNA analysis is especially troubling in light of significant 
concerns that have been raised with non-DNA forensic 
methodologies.17 The goal of any of forensic analysis is to 
“individualize” a sample and match it to a person or a source 
for purposes of showing guilt or innocence.18 However, only 
DNA has been shown to be able to do this with scientific 
certainty based on repeated, consistent research results; other 
disciplines have varying levels of available research and set 
protocols to ensure the validity of testing results.19 The result is 
a patchwork of different disciplines with different levels of 
discriminating power, administered by practitioners who may 
lack the necessary training to properly interpret results or may 
ignore results altogether.20 
1. The NAS Report 
In order to analyze the current state of these various 
forensic disciplines and propose improvements to the forensic 
science profession, the National Academy of Sciences conducted 
a thorough study of forensic science in Strengthening Forensic 
Science in the United States: A Path Forward, specifically 
focusing on the needs and operations of forensic science outside 
the realm of DNA analysis.21 The NAS Report called into 
question many of the current practices of forensic laboratories, 
and suggested avenues to improve the quality of forensic 
investigation throughout the country.22 Among its many 
recommendations was the implementation of mandatory 
accreditation for all forensic facilities and forensic 
practitioners.23 The NAS Report stressed that accreditation 
cannot prevent mistakes from happening, but would prevent 
forensic practitioners from “taking shortcuts” and 
                                                          
biology (including DNA) testing. MATTHEW R. DUROSE ET AL., BUREAU OF 
JUSTICE STATISTICS, CENSUS OF PUBLICLY FUNDED FORENSIC CRIME 
LABORATORIES 2009, at 2 tbl.1 (2012), available at http://www.bjs.gov/ 
content/pub/pdf/cpffcl09.pdf. 
 17. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 7–8. 
 18. Id. at 7. 
 19. Id. at 7–8. 
 20. Simon A. Cole, Forensic Science and Wrongful Convictions: From 
Exposer to Contributor to Corrector, 46 NEW ENG. L. REV. 711, 735 (2012). 
 21. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 1. 
 22. Id. at 3–4. 
 23. Id. at 215. 
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compromising the quality of their work by ensuring that 
laboratories are run with set quality standards24 and rely on 
acceptable practices.25 In addition to accrediting labs, it also 
recommended the certification of individual scientists to ensure 
their competency.26 The NAS Report named several such 
certification programs that already exist for various forensic 
science disciplines,27 including drug analyst certification 
through an exam administered by the American Board of 
Criminalistics.28 
In addition to accreditation and implementing strong 
standards, the NAS Report explained the importance of 
“proficiency testing” as another safeguard to ensure quality 
results.29 Proficiency testing can take several forms, but has 
two main variants: a “declared” test in which the examiner is 
aware he or she is analyzing a test sample, or a “blind” test in 
which he or she is unaware the sample is for testing and not a 
real case.30 Commentators have found that forensic 
professionals “loathe proficiency testing,”31 but it can be useful 
to measure performance of laboratories and identify potential 
problems with the performance of individuals or the use of 
testing instruments.32 Laboratories accredited by the American 
Society of Crime Lab Directors (ASCLD), a body of forensic 
professionals that promulgates forensic science standards, are 
required to complete at least one proficiency test annually for 
each of its provided forensic disciplines.33 
In attempting to propose how these new procedures and 
standards would be implemented, the NAS Report specifically 
                                                          
 24. Id. at 201 (“Adherence to standards reduces bias, improves 
consistency, and enhances the validity and reliability of results.”). 
 25. Id. at 195. 
 26. Id. at 209. 
 27. See id. at 209–10, for a complete list. 
 28. Certification Program Overview, AM. BOARD CRIMINALISTICS, 
http://www.criminalistics.com/cert_ovw.cfm (last visited Mar. 13, 2013). 
 29. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 206. 
 30. Id. at 207. 
 31. Craig M. Cooley, Nurturing Forensic Science, 17 TEX. WESLEYAN L. 
REV. 441, 478 (2011). 
 32. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 215 (recommending that forensic 
labs establish quality control procedures to ensure work accuracy and identify 
fraud and mistakes). 
 33. AM. SOC’Y OF CRIME LAB. DIRS. LAB. ACCREDITATION BD., 
PROFICIENCY TESTING AND REVIEW PROGRAM 4 (2011) [hereinafter 
PROFICIENCY TESTING AND REVIEW PROGRAM], available at http://www.ascld-
lab.org/documents/AL-PD-1020.pdf. 
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called for a “strong, independent, strategic, coherent, and well-
funded federal program to support and oversee the forensic 
science disciplines in this country.”34 The agency, named in the 
NAS Report as the National Institute of Forensic Science,35 
would then mandate accreditation of laboratories and 
individual professionals36 and provide funding for research to 
validate and measure scientific accuracy in forensic practices.37 
Such a body would need to be independent from existing 
criminal justice regulators, such as the Department of Justice 
(DOJ), in order for it to be as objective and free from history 
and biases as possible.38 Additionally, the NAS Report 
recommended improving the education of forensic scientists 
through development of improved graduate programs and use 
of scholarships to attract ideal candidates.39 
2. Current Federal Regulation 
Federal regulation of general forensic disciplines beyond 
DNA-specific legislation currently consists of requirements 
attached to grant provisions, such as those contained in the 
Paul Coverdell National Forensic Sciences Improvement Act in 
2000.40 The aim of this bill was to reduce significant backlogs in 
processing forensic evidence through block grants to states to 
fund new equipment, training, and personnel for laboratories.41 
These grants were to be given only if labs were accredited by 
the ASCLD or would use the funds to seek this certification.42 
In 2004, the Justice for All Act further required that labs 
receiving funding also be governed by an entity capable of 
                                                          
 34. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 20. 
 35. Id. at 19. 
 36. Id. at 25–26. See also Paul C. Giannelli, Wrongful Convictions and 
Forensic Science: The Need to Regulate Crime Labs, 86 N.C. L. REV. 163, 227–
34 (2007) (emphasizing the importance of a forensics commission in setting 
standards and funding laboratories). 
 37. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 24–25. 
 38. Id. at 80. 
 39. Id. at 27–28. 
 40. Paul Coverdell National Forensic Sciences Improvement Act of 2000, 
Pub. L. No. 106-561, 114 Stat. 2787 (codified as amended in scattered sections 
of 42 U.S.C. (2006)). 
 41. DNA Crime Labs: The Paul Coverdell National Forensic Sciences 
Improvement Act: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 107th Cong. 
3 (2001) (statement of Sen. Orrin G. Hatch, Chairman, S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary). 
 42. Id. 
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investigating allegations of misconduct or serious negligence in 
order to be eligible for grants.43 
These attempts at regulating state and local forensic 
laboratories are essential because the “lion’s share” of criminal 
prosecutions44 and evidence processing45 occurs in state 
criminal justice systems. However, the efficacy of this federal 
scheme to affect change for this fragmented variety of forensic 
science providers has been questioned.46 As a general matter, 
predicating the operations of state and local entities on federal 
funding, while upheld in South Dakota v. Dole,47 raises 
significant issues of federalism and calls into  question whether 
Congress’s spending power is a constitutionally proper 
mechanism to influence state behavior.48 Ryan Goldstein, in a 
student note written for the University of Texas Law Review, 
found that the Coverdell Program federal grants constituted a 
very small percentage of state and local laboratory operating 
budgets based on 2005 figures;49 this disparity between federal 
funding and local spending has since increased, according to 
more recent reports from the Bureau of Justice Statistics.50 
                                                          
 43. Justice for All Act of 2004, 42 U.S.C. § 3797k(4) (2006). 
 44. Ryan M. Goldstein, Note, Improving Forensic Science Through State 
Oversight, 90 TEX. L. REV. 225, 233 (2011); see also A PATH FORWARD, supra 
note 1, at 5–6 (emphasizing the workload of state and local law enforcement 
and the disparity in resources available in state and federal systems); STEVEN 
W. PERRY & DUREN BANKS, BUREAU OF JUSTICE STATISTICS, PROSECUTORS IN 
STATE COURTS 2007—STATISTICAL TABLES, at 2–3 (2007), available at 
http://www.bjs.gov/content/pub/pdf/psc07st.pdf (providing that state 
prosecutors’ offices closed 2.9 million felony cases in 2007). 
 45. State and local labs received ninety-three percent of total requests for 
forensic services in 2009. DUROSE ET AL., supra note 16, at 5 tbl.7. 
 46. Cf. Goldstein, supra note 44, at 233 (focusing on state oversight of 
forensic facilities and claiming that other commentators have failed to do so). 
 47. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). 
 48. There has been significant scholarly debate about Congress’s spending 
power and the wisdom of the Dole decision. Compare Lynn A. Baker & 
Mitchell N. Berman, Getting off the Dole: Why the Court Should Abandon Its 
Spending Doctrine and How a Too-Clever Congress Could Provoke It to Do So, 
78 IND. L.J. 459, 470 (2003) (arguing that Dole is “intellectually suspect” and 
will “continue to yield . . . troublesome results”), with Erwin Chemerinsky, 
Protecting the Spending Power, 4 CHAP. L. REV. 89, 92 (2000) (“[A] broad 
definition of the spending power is desirable.”). 
 49. See Goldstein, supra note 44, at 233 n.71. 
 50. The Bureau of Justice Statistics estimates the 2009 operating budget 
of state and local labs at $1.213 billion. DUROSE ET AL., supra note 16, at 10 
tbl.14. Only $10.8 million has been awarded to state and local labs in 2012 
under the Coverdell program.  Coverdell Forensic Science Improvement Grants 
Program: Applications and Awards, 2002–2011, NAT’L INST. JUST.,  
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Furthermore, the requirement that labs be subject to external 
auditing has reportedly not been enforced by the DOJ.51 
3. State Standards 
Regulation and funding of forensic laboratories largely 
remains the prerogative of local legislators and executives.52 
Publicly funded labs are run by states, counties, and 
municipalities,53 and their regulation is dependent on the 
government body responsible.54 As a consequence, standards 
for lab operation vary from state to state. A few states have 
voluntarily chosen to pursue accreditation for all of their 
forensic facilities, using state-created standards.55 Other 
jurisdictions requiring accreditation have mandated use of an 
outside professional forensic science agency like the American 
Society of Crime Laboratory Directors.56 For the most part, 
state legislation either fails to address accreditation at all or, as 
is the case in Minnesota and Massachusetts, “encourage[s]” 
                                                          
http://www.nij.gov/topics/forensics/lab-operations/capacity/nfsia/nfsia-
applications-funding.htm (last updated Nov. 16, 2012). 
 51. Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 10, at 94. See also  OFFICE OF THE 
INSPECTOR GEN., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, REVIEW OF THE OFFICE OF JUSTICE 
PROGRAMS’ PAUL COVERDELL FORENSIC SCIENCE IMPROVEMENT GRANTS 
PROGRAM 8 (2008) [hereinafter INSPECTOR GENERAL REVIEW OF GRANTS 
PROGRAM]. 
 52. See Goldstein, supra note 44, at 233 (“The decisions of state 
legislatures and state executives—and not those of the United States 
Congress—determine a state’s forensic science policies, the structure of its 
laboratories, and changes to its regulatory scheme.”). 
 53. The 2009 DOJ census of publicly funded labs analyzed laboratories 
based on their designation as state, county, or municipal entities. See DUROSE 
ET AL., supra note 16. 
 54. See Goldstein, supra note 44, at 233. 
 55. See, e.g., MD. CODE ANN., HEALTH–GEN. § 17-2A-02 (LexisNexis 2012) 
(Secretary of Health sets standards and requirements for forensic 
laboratories); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995 (McKinney 2012) (Commission on 
Forensic Science sets standards); TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.35 
(West 2012) (Department of Public Safety sets standards). 
 56. The ASCLD has certified 326 state and local crime laboratories, 
including at least one in every state. ASCLD/LAB Accredited Laboratories, 
AM. SOC’Y CRIME LABORATORY DIRECTORS, http://ascld-
lab.org/labstatus/accreditedlabs.html (last visited Oct. 27, 2012); see also D.C. 
CODE § 5-1501.06 (2012) (requiring all public crime laboratories to be 
accredited by a nationally recognized organization); Forensic Laboratory 
Accreditation Act, OKLA. STAT. tit. 74, §§ 150.36–37 (2012) (requiring all 
public crime laboratories to be accredited by a nationally recognized 
organization). 
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facilities to pursue it.57 Many labs do choose to seek 
accreditation on their own; ninety-two percent of state forensic 
crime labs had attained accreditation from an organization like 
the Laboratory Assessment Board division of the ASCLD 
(ASCLD/LAB) as of 2009.58 However, the same was true of only 
sixty-two percent of municipal and seventy-five percent of 
county laboratories.59 
Several states, including Massachusetts and Minnesota, 
have also created forensic advisory boards to handle complaints 
of misconduct and oversee operation of laboratories60 which are 
likely to meet the requirements of the Justice for All Act. 
However, these boards have been criticized as ineffective and 
underfunded,61 and Minnesota’s board has specifically reported 
that it “lacks the financial resources necessary to carry out its 
principal missions” of investigating allegations of misconduct 
and fraud.62 The Minnesota Forensic Laboratory Advisory 
Board’s procedure for obtaining allegations of misconduct 
simply consists of a web page providing an address to which a 
complaint may be written.63 The Board then screens complaints 
based on a set of criteria and may appoint an investigative 
team if a complaint warrants such action.64 The Massachusetts 
Forensic Sciences Advisory Board, in contrast, has no 
investigative powers bestowed on it by statute, with its duties  
 
 
                                                          
 57. See MINN. STAT. § 299C.156 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS  ch. 6, § 184A 
(2012) (delegating to the state forensic advisory board responsibility to study 
accreditation status of crime labs in the state); see also A PATH FORWARD, 
supra note 1, at 194 (“[W]ith the exception of [a few states], the accreditation 
of laboratories . . . remains voluntary.”). 
 58. DUROSE ET AL., supra note 16, at 1 fig.1. 
 59. Id. 
 60. E.g., MINN. STAT. § 299C.156 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS  ch. 6, § 184A 
(2012); N.Y. EXEC. LAW § 995 (McKinney 2012). 
 61. See INSPECTOR GENERAL REVIEW OF GRANTS PROGRAM, supra note 51, 
at 8; see also States’ Efforts to Probe Crime Labs Stall at Start, AUGUSTA 
CHRON., Mar. 24, 2007, at A13. 
 62. STATE OF MINN. FORENSIC LAB. ADVISORY BD., LEGISTLATIVE REPORT 
1 (2012), available at https://dps.mn.gov/entity/flab/Documents/Legislative% 
20Report%201-15-12.pdf. 
 63. Reporting Professional Negligence or Misconduct, MINN. FORENSIC 
LABORATORY ADVISORY BOARD, https://dps.mn.gov/entity/flab/Pages/reporting-
professional-negligence-or-misconduct.aspx (last visited Feb. 1, 2013). 
 64. MINN. FORENSIC LAB. ADVISORY BD., POLICIES AND PROCEDURES, at 
§§ 3.0–4.0 (2012), available at https://dps.mn.gov/entity/flab/Documents/ 
FLAB%20Policies%20and%20Procedures%202012.pdf. 
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being primarily oversight of operations, funding, and 
accreditation of the state’s forensic laboratories.65 
4. The Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act 
One attempt to implement the NAS Report through federal 
legislation came from Senator Patrick Leahy, who introduced a 
Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act in 2011 
aimed at implementing widespread reform in the forensic 
sciences.66 Based in part on the findings of the NAS Report,67 
the Act would have established an independent federal 
Forensic Science Board to create standards and promote good 
practices, as well as an Office of Forensic Science within the 
DOJ to administer the Board’s recommendations.68 The Board 
would then have acted to create procedures for accreditation of 
forensic science laboratories, as well as certification for each 
individual working in those laboratories.69 Any lab lacking 
certification under these standards, for either the facility or 
any of its personnel, would be barred from receiving any direct 
or indirect federal funding.70 
The Act also would have required the Board to develop a 
“comprehensive strategy for fostering and improving peer-
reviewed scientific research relating to the forensic science 
disciplines,” to both validate and improve the reliability of 
existing forensic techniques and develop new methods of 
forensic investigation.71 There were also provisions related to 
improving the education of current criminal justice 
practitioners72 and of undergraduate and graduate students 
                                                          
 65. MASS. GEN. LAWS  ch. 6, § 184A (2012) (“[T]he undersecretary for 
forensic sciences shall advise the board on the administration and delivery of 
forensic services in the commonwealth.”). 
 66. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132, 
112th Cong. 
 67. Improving Forensic Science in the Criminal Justice System: Hearing 
on S. 132 Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 112th Cong. 1 (2012) 
(statement of Sen. Patrick Leahy, Chairman, S. Comm. on the Judiciary) 
(describing the NAS Report as a “starting point for a searching review of the 
state of forensic science in the country”). 
 68. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132, 
112th Cong. § 101–02. 
 69. Id. §§ 202, 303. 
 70. Id. §§ 201, 302. 
 71. Id. §§ 401–02. 
 72. Id. § 601. 
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wishing to enter the forensic science disciplines.73 The Act 
would have appropriated funding for various grants to 
laboratories and research entities, as well as for operations of 
the two agencies created and their sub-committees.74 The bill 
did not pass in the 112th Congress75 and has yet to be re-
introduced by Senator Leahy in the 113th Congress.76 
B. WHEN FORENSIC SCIENCE FAILS THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE 
SYSTEM 
The effectiveness of current regulation of forensic 
laboratories has been called into question by a number of 
academics and criminal law practitioners.77 Recent scandals 
involving forensic laboratories highlight this concern. This Note 
will focus on two specific examples: the operation of a crime 
laboratory in St. Paul, Minnesota, and the conduct of a drug 
analyst in Jamaica Plain, Massachusetts. 
1. The St. Paul Problem 
Problems with forensic science results commonly stem 
from improper laboratory policies and procedures78 and are 
exemplified by the procedures now being exposed at the St. 
Paul, Minnesota, crime laboratory regarding evidence handling 
                                                          
 73. Id. § 602. 
 74. See, e.g., id. § 402(c) (appropriating $90,000,000 per year for research 
grants); § 104 (appropriating $40,000,000 per year for operation of the Board 
and the Office). 
 75. The bill was referred to the Senate Committee on the Judiciary and 
was never considered by the full Congress. Bill Summary & Status, S.132, 
112th Congress, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112: 
SN00132:@@@X (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
 76. A check of bills introduced in the 113th Congress by Senator Leahy 
provide that he has not re-introduced a bill addressing forensic science reform. 
Bill Summary & Status 112th Congress (2011–2012) S.132 All Congressional 
Actions, THOMAS, http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d112:SN00132: 
@@@X (last visited Feb. 2, 2013). 
 77. See, e.g., A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 6; Cooley, supra note 33, 
at 441 (“Tremendous scrutiny has been directed at the forensic science 
community recently. . . . [T]he majority of the blame can be placed on two 
situations: (1) the numerous crime laboratory problems and scandals, and (2) 
the DNA exonerations involving unvalidated forensic technology, forensic 
evidence improperly used beyond its scientific parameters, or exaggerated 
testimony from a forensic analyst.”); Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 10, at 93–
95. 
 78. Cf. Cooley, supra note 31, at 442 (“[S]ignificant evidence has surfaced 
over the last decade indicating that public crime laboratories . . . are 
inadequately funded, staffed, and regulated.”). 
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and testing protocol.79 Employees at the lab have testified that 
they did not follow any written procedures in conducting 
testing of possible illegal substances.80 Employees claimed that 
some of the lab equipment was poorly ventilated, causing it to 
possibly spew illegal substances into the air and contaminate 
subsequent tests.81 Tests may also have been unreliable due to 
the failure of technicians to properly change their gloves in 
between tests, as well as multiple uses of the same tool when 
interacting with different samples.82 Evidence from criminal 
cases was improperly stored in a hallway, and guests to the 
laboratory may have had access to unattended evidence 
samples left on work stations.83 All of these issues came to light 
during testimony in connection with four drug cases in Dakota 
County, Minnesota.84 This evidence has all emerged in a 
hearing under a Dakota County judge, who has already had 
multiple hearings on the admissibility of drug evidence 
produced by the laboratory and will not issue a ruling until 
sometime after May 3, 2013.85 Two outside consultants hired to 
evaluate the lab have confirmed these issues, citing poor 
procedures, faulty scientific procedure, and dirty equipment as 
some of the main culprits.86 
Deficiencies in the laboratory’s procedures were known to 
St. Paul police and the city government; a 2006 report by a 
police official recommended ASCLD accreditation87 and over $1 
                                                          
 79. See Chao Xiong, Case Tied to Faulty Lab Dropped, STAR TRIB., Oct. 9, 
2012, at B1. 
 80. Madeleine Baran, Hearing on St. Paul Police Crime Lab Problems 
Wraps Up, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS (Oct. 23, 2012), http://minnesota. 
publicradio.org/display/web/2012/10/23/law/st-paul-crime-lab/. 
 81. Chao Xiong, Crime Lab Reviews Cost $140K, STAR TRIB., Sept. 7, 
2012, at B1. 
 82. Id. 
 83. Id. 
 84. Chao Xiong, Defense Attorneys Decry Retested Evidence, STAR TRIB., 
Dec. 6, 2012, at B3. 
 85. Madeleine Baran, Judge Postpones Crucial Decision in St. Paul Crime 
Lab Case, MINN. PUB. RADIO NEWS (Feb. 22, 2013), 
http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2013/02/22/news/judge-
postpones-crucial-decision-in-st-paul-crime-lab-case. 
 86. Apparently one of the employees even attempted to cite Wikipedia as 
a “technical reference.” Madeline Baran, Troubled St. Paul Crime Lab 
Problems Even Worse than First Thought, Probe Reveals, MINN. PUB. RADIO 
(Feb. 14, 2013), http://minnesota.publicradio.org/display/web/2013/02/14/ 
news/saint-paul-crime-lab-major-errors-found. 
 87. David Hanners, St. Paul Crime Lab Woes First Recognized in 2006, 
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million for new equipment and employee costs.88 St. Paul failed 
to follow through on either accreditation or the bulk of the 
funding recommendations of the report.89 The report further 
provided that the paucity of monies available to the lab has 
overburdened the staff and limited the laboratory’s ability to 
“sustain [its] current rates of evidence examination and 
testing.”90 
2. The Jamaica Plain Problem 
Another type of recurring problem is with so-called “bad 
apple” forensic professionals, who provide false or inaccurate 
test results and subsequent trial testimony.91 This problem has 
arisen recently with a Boston-area forensic analyst named 
Annie Dookhan who is alleged to have falsified testing results 
on numerous occasions.92 Dookhan has been accused of 
sprinkling known drugs onto unrelated samples in order to 
obtain positive results.93 Dookhan has also admitted to “dry-
labbing” or the identifying a sample without actually 
performing any tests on that substance.94 She is alleged to have 
failed to properly handle evidence and run control samples 
before testing evidence.95 The Jamaica Plain laboratory has 
been shut down since the summer of 2012, and Dookhan has 
resigned as a result of her admissions to police and subsequent 
inquiry into the lab’s operations.96 She currently faces twenty 
                                                          
PIONEER PRESS, Sept. 1, 2012, at 1A (quoting from the report which said that 
ASCLD accreditation would take the lab to “the highest standards . . . as well 
as gaining added credibility for the lab”). 
 88. Id. (“Lynch identified $606,750 worth of ‘critical’ equipment, staffing 
and training needs. He listed another $579,850 in tools, positions and 
education costs . . . .”). 
 89. Id. 
 90. Staff were apparently so burdened with testing responsibilities that 
they were unable to attend training sessions offered at no cost from the 
government and private vendors. Id. 
 91. See, e.g., Giannelli, supra note 36, at 172–208 (detailing numerous 
examples). 
 92. John R. Ellement et al., State Chemist Accused of Mixing Drug 
Samples, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 13, 2012, at B1. 
 93. Id. 
 94. Brian Ballou & Andrea Estes, ‘I Messed Up Bad. It’s My Fault,’ 
Chemist Says, BOS. GLOBE, Sept. 27, 2012, at A1. 
 95. See Report from Detective Lieutenant Robert M. Irwin to Lieutenant 
Colonel Francis J. Matthews, Mass. State Police (Sept. 12, 2012) (Interview of 
Annie Dookhan), available at http://www.boston.com/news/local/ 
breaking_news/Dookhan.Discovery%209.26.12.pdf. 
 96. Denise Lavoie, Ex-State Chemist Pleads Not Guilty, BOS. GLOBE, Jan. 
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charges in various Massachusetts district courts stemming 
from her misconduct and has so far pled not guilty to the 
assorted offenses, which mainly consist of obstruction of 
justice.97 While Dookhan’s exact reasons for the misconduct are 
unknown, at least one author has posited that a backlog at the 
Jamaica Plain lab may have caused her to cut corners in an 
attempt to deal with her workload.98 
3. Consequences 
All of these problems have had very real results on the 
administration of justice in our criminal courts. There have 
been more than 300 exonerations of convicted felons since the 
advent of DNA testing,99 with a large percentage of those initial 
convictions based on faulty forensic science.100 In the Dookhan 
case, almost 34,000 criminal cases could be affected, including 
1,100 people currently in jail or prison.101 At least one 
prosecution has been dropped as a result of the St. Paul 
scandal, with more than one hundred other testing results 
being re-examined by the Minnesota Bureau of Criminal 
Apprehension’s laboratory.102 The fiscal fallout of these cases is 
yet to be determined, and has been estimated to be more than 
$30 million in Massachusetts103 and has already cost the City 
of St. Paul more than $140,000 in Minnesota.104 St. Paul has 
also been forced to set aside nearly $1 million in a contingency 
fund to take care of resulting future costs in the form of 
                                                          
31, 2013, available at http://www.bostonglobe.com/metro/2013/01/31/ chemist-
annie-dookhan-pleads-not-guilty-obstruction/8LSlUcGVCpXkSHYred9omI/ 
story.html. 
 97. Id. 
 98. The laboratory had already applied for federal funding to deal with a 
backlog of 8,000 cases. Eugenie Samuel Reich, Boston Scandal Exposes 
Backlog, 490 NATURE 153, 153 (2012). 
 99. According to The Innocence Project, there have been 303 post-
conviction exonerations due to DNA analysis. Know the Cases, INNOCENCE 
PROJECT, http://www.innocenceproject.org/know/ (last visited Mar. 8, 2013). 
 100. See Garrett & Neufeld, supra note 10, at 1–2 (explaining that their 
study concluded that sixty percent of cases they examined contained forensic 
analyst testimony with misstated or wholly missing empirical data). 
 101. See Reich, supra note 98, at 153. 
 102. Xiong, supra note 79, at B1. 
 103. John R. Ellement, Prosecutors Say $30m Not Enough for Drug Lab 
Scandal Fallout, BOS. GLOBE, Nov. 3, 2012, at B2. 
 104. Xiong, supra note 84, at B3. 
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consultant fees and re-testing in other labs.105 In light of the 
widespread effect of these forensic mishaps, it is important to 
examine what impact, if any, the Criminal Justice and Forensic 
Science Reform Act could have on the operation of forensic labs. 
II. FEDERAL LEGISLATION: A BAND-AID OR A CURE? 
A. THE DEVIL’S IN THE DETAILS: CRITIQUING THE CRIMINAL 
JUSTICE AND SCIENCE REFORM ACT 
Hanging over federal legislative efforts to reform forensic 
science, like the Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform 
Act, is a question: can these measures live up to their billing 
and truly reform forensic science? In the case of the Act, the 
answer is a qualified no. For every step the bill took toward 
improving the operations of forensic disciplines and better 
regulating the profession, the language of the bill was either 
too vague or wholly failed to address significant issues which 
are essential to promoting these goals. In order to ensure that 
forensic science continues its progress toward becoming so-
called “real” science and can prevent future mishaps from 
occurring, legislators will need to build upon the ideas in the 
Act, work to ensure greater funding for those in the forensic 
field, and perhaps put greater emphasis on affecting change at 
the state and local government levels. 
1. Accreditation and Certification 
The Act is most significant in the steps it takes toward 
implementing some of the reforms mentioned in the NAS 
Report. The creation of a Forensic Science Board (the Board) to 
determine best standards and practices for laboratories106 is a 
cornerstone of the NAS Report and essential to federal 
administration of forensic standards. Previous federal 
regulation merely required labs to obtain some sort of outside 
accreditation;107 this provision takes the responsibility for lab 
                                                          
 105. The police have already budgeted one-third of this money to be spent 
on consultants and a contract with the state crime lab, as the St. Paul lab is 
currently performing only fingerprint analysis. Mara H. Gottfried, St. Paul 
Crime Lab: Police Detail Plans for $1M More from City, PIONEER PRESS (Jan. 
31, 2013), http://www.twincities.com/crime/ci_22492197/st-paul-crime-lab-
police-detail-plans-1m?. 
 106. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132, 
112th Cong. § 102(d)(1) (“The Board shall . . . make recommendations to the 
Director relating to . . . accreditation and certification standards . . . .”). 
 107. See supra notes 40–43 and accompanying text. 
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standards out of the hands of third parties and puts it into 
more direct control by the government. This is not to say that 
those outside standards are meritless. In fact, the Act proposes 
that a newly created Board use standards like the ASCLD/LAB 
in promulgating their laboratory regulations108 and would 
allow accreditation through third parties.109 
Specifically, the ASCLD/LAB’s accreditation program 
requires that laboratories have in place: 
 [P]rocedures to protect evidence loss, cross-transfer, 
contamination, and/or deleterious change; 
 validated and documented technical procedures; 
 the use of appropriate controls and standards; 
 calibration procedures; 
 complete documentation of all evidence examination; 
 a documented training program that includes competency 
testing; 
 technical review of a portion of each examiner’s work 
product; 
 testimony monitoring of all who testify; and 
 a comprehensive proficiency testing program.110 
The Board could choose to implement these requirements 
wholesale or modify them as they see fit, so long as these 
standards include education, proficiency testing, and auditing 
requirements for laboratories.111 The Act would then allow the 
Board to enforce them through the machinery of government—
in this case, the also newly created Office of Forensic Science 
within the DOJ.112 
The provision of the Act requiring certification of 
individual forensic scientists113 is something lacking in current 
federal regulation114 and is another significant step toward 
                                                          
 108. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132, 
112th Cong. § 202(a)(3)(A)(i) (the Board must consider “relevant national 
accreditation standards” in setting its recommendations). 
 109. Id. § 203 (a)(2)(A). 
 110. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 198 (citing R. Stacey, President, 
ASCLD/LAB, Presentation to the Committee (Jan. 25, 2007)). 
 111. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132, 
112th Cong. § 202(a)(3)(B). 
 112. Id. § 101(e)(2)(A). 
 113. Id. § 302 (“[A] forensic science laboratory or covered entity may not 
receive, directly or indirectly, any Federal funds, unless all relevant personnel 
of the forensic science laboratory or covered entity are certified under this 
title.”). 
 114. See Goldstein, supra note 44, at 252 n.217 (“The forensic science 
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ensuring competency of forensic practitioners. These 
certifications can be obtained through outside organizations,115 
which typically require applicants to undergo training and pass 
an examination on the discipline in which they wish to be 
certified.116 Specifically, for drug analysts, the American Board 
of Criminalistics requires successful completion of an exam and 
a proficiency test, as well as two years of experience.117 A four-
year degree in a natural science is optional and allows the 
applicant to apply for a higher level of certification.118 There is 
also a lower “affiliate” level of certification for those who do not 
yet have two years of specialized experience.119 While some of 
the certification programs have been critiqued as lacking 
stringent requirements,120 certification of individuals is an 
important addition to the overall regulatory scheme to ensure 
that lab employees are trained and able to follow scientific 
procedures. Accreditation of labs only covers the operating 
procedures and facilities of laboratories; it does not address the 
education and skill of those working within them. 
A preliminary issue with the system the Act puts in place 
is the two-tiered nature of this accrediting scheme: the Board 
recommends standards, and the Office of Forensic Science (the 
Office) within the DOJ enforces them.121 For an Act that is 
purportedly based on the NAS Report, this provision goes 
directly against one of its recommendations—independence of 
regulatory bodies from traditional law enforcement.122 The 
Board is nominally autonomous through the mandated 
scientific make-up of its board members123 and has relative 
                                                          
community generally supports certification but does not require it.”). 
 115. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132, 
112th Cong. § 304(b)(1) (providing that the Director may choose one or more 
outside organizations through which to certify individuals in particular 
forensic disciplines). 
 116. See, e.g., Certification Program Overview, supra note 28. 
 117. Id. 
 118. Id. 
 119. Id. 
 120. See, e.g., A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 209 (citing numerous 
news articles on the potential ease of obtaining some types of scientific expert 
credentials). 
 121. See supra notes 111–12 and accompanying text. 
 122. See A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 183–84 (detailing the 
“significant concerns related to the independence of the laboratory and its 
budget”). 
 123. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132, 
112th Cong. § 102(b)(3) (“The Board shall include . . . not fewer than 10 
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freedom to recommend regulations as it sees fit.124 However, 
the Board’s counterpart, the Office, is placed directly within the 
main law-enforcement arm of the U.S. government. The Office 
has ultimate responsibility for establishing, implementing, and 
enforcing the accreditation and certification standards under 
the Act; the Board acts merely to make recommendations to 
them.125 With this responsibility comes the worry that the 
Office will be less than diligent in its enforcement to prevent 
hampering law enforcement at the lower levels.126 This risk of 
biased enforcement is a significant one, and is in direct 
contravention of one of the recommendations of the NAS 
Report.127 Similarly, the Act also fails to follow the NAS Report 
by omitting a requirement that forensic laboratories 
themselves be independent from law enforcement entities.128 
Another concern with the Act’s accrediting scheme is that 
it uses the same enforcement mechanism as the Coverdell 
Grants program––namely, the funding or withholding of 
funds129––which raises significant doubts that these new 
accreditation standards will be as “mandatory” as the Act 
claims they will be and as envisioned by the NAS Report.130 
Under the Act, the Director of the Office of Forensic Science is 
charged with verifying that laboratories and forensic 
professionals employed therein meet the standards the Board 
promulgates before providing federal funds to these labs.131 
This use of “spending power” regulation is nearly identical to 
the Coverdell program, which similarly premises funding on 
conformity with the program’s accreditation and oversight 
requirements.132 Congress has frequently used its control of the 
                                                          
members who have comprehensive scientific backgrounds . . . .”). 
 124. Id. § 202(a)(3)(B) (detailing what accreditation standards must 
include); § 303(a)(2) (same for certification standards). 
 125. Id. § 201(b). 
 126. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 80–81 (arguing that a national 
body tasked with implementing the recommendations of the report must not 
be part of a law enforcement agency). 
 127. Id. 
 128. Cf. Goldstein, supra note 44, at 250 (claiming that the NAS Report’s 
recommendation of independent forensic facilities is “infeasible and unlikely to 
receive political support”). 
 129. See supra Part I.A.2. 
 130. See supra text accompanying notes 106–12; supra text accompanying 
notes 23–25. 
 131. See supra Part I.A.4. 
 132. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3797k (West 2012). 
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fiscal purse to direct activity of states and local bodies after the 
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of such conduct in 
South Dakota v. Dole.133 The Court in Dole held that the 
congressional use of the spending power in this manner is 
permissible so long as it meets a five-part test determining 
whether Congress is intending to coerce states with federal 
funds.134 This holding has been broadly interpreted,135 and it is 
unlikely the courts would find issue with the funding scheme in 
the Act. 
Assuming the Act’s constitutionality, the more important 
question is whether this use of funding as an enforcement 
mechanism will be effective in achieving the Act’s stated goal of 
“strengthen[ing] and promot[ing] confidence in the criminal 
justice system.”136 Kyle Goldstein examined the similar funding 
provisions in the Coverdell grant program, and postulated that 
they failed to lead to meaningful reform at the state and local 
level, largely because Coverdell funding constituted too small a 
percentage of forensic laboratory operating budgets.137 
Goldstein’s concerns can be applied wholesale to the Act. 
This bill only authorizes $10 million in new grant money to 
assist laboratories in attaining accreditation.138 Even when 
added to the grants already available under the Coverdell 
program, federal funding constitutes an ever-shrinking piece of 
                                                          
 133. South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203 (1987). See, e.g., David E. 
Engdahl, The Contract Thesis of the Federal Spending Power, 52 S.D. L. Rev. 
496, 535 (2007) (“Congress today probably directs more human behavior by 
conditions accompanying federal funding than by any exercise of its legislative 
powers.”). 
 134. The five prongs are: (1) exercise of the spending power must be for the 
“general welfare” and courts defer substantially to Congressional judgment in 
this regard; (2) Congress must make the condition required to receive funding 
unambiguous; (3) conditions on funding must be related to the federal interest 
in national projects or programs; (4) conditions must also be in accordance 
with other constitutional provisions; and (5) the conditions specified must not 
be so coercive as to turn pressure into compulsion. See Baker & Berman, supra 
note 48, at 463–69 (detailing the Dole test and its subsequent application by 
various courts). 
 135. See, e.g., id. at 468 (“[L]ower courts have consistently failed to find 
impermissible coercion.”). 
 136. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132, 
112th Cong. § 3. 
 137. See Goldstein, supra note 44, at 256–57 (claiming that “states spend 
significantly more on forensic science operations than the federal government 
offers”). 
 138. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132, 
112th Cong. § 305(b)(1). 
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the funding pie for forensic facilities as their operating budgets 
continue to increase.139 According to a report issued by the 
DOJ’s Bureau of Justice Statistics, Coverdell grants constituted 
less than two percent of total laboratory operating budgets in 
2009.140 Criminal justice regulation has long been the purview 
of the states,141 and it is doubtful that states will have incentive 
to implement real change if the only sanction they face for non-
compliance is the loss of a sliver of their overall lab funding. 
2. What This Means for Reform and Preventing Future 
Scandals 
The Act’s failure to effectively mandate accreditation and 
certification is disheartening because both are crucial to 
preventing the recurrence of forensic misconduct. Neither the 
St. Paul nor the Jamaica Plain drug analysis laboratories were 
accredited by their respective state governments or an outside 
body like the ASCLD/LAB.142 In fact, the city of St. Paul 
expressly decided not to seek accreditation or provide 
additional funding to the laboratory when a report 
recommended such measures.143 The consequent lack of 
standard operating procedures at the St. Paul crime lab was 
cited as contributing to the problems with the drug analysis.144 
This is something that could have been corrected with the 
oversight of a regulatory body. If this laboratory had been 
mandated to seek accreditation, it would also mean that 
proficiency testing would have been required.145 These tests 
                                                          
 139. See DUROSE ET AL., supra note 16, at 10 tbl.14 (displaying annual 
operating budgets for publicly funded state and local forensic crime 
laboratories as $738 million in 2002 and $1.213 billion in 2009). 
 140. Compare id. (citing the total annual operating budget of publicly 
funded state and local forensic laboratories as $1.213 billion in 2009), with 
Coverdell Forensic Science Improvement Grants Program: Applications and 
Awards, 2002–2011, supra note 50 (less than $23.4 million awarded to labs in 
2009). 
 141. Cf., e.g., U.S. v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 637–43 (1995) (holding that 
criminal statutes which fail to substantially affect interstate commerce do not 
fall within Congress’s regulatory power under the Commerce Clause). 
 142. These laboratories do not appear on the ASCLD website as accredited 
labs. See ASCLD/LAB Accredited Laboratories, supra note 56. 
 143. See supra notes 87–90 and accompanying text. 
 144. See, e.g., Baran, supra note 80. 
 145. PROFICIENCY TESTING AND REVIEW PROGRAM, supra note 33, at 4–6 
(establishing a review program that requires accredited laboratories to 
participate in proficiency testing). 
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could have validated the accuracy of the testing machinery and 
caught issues with contamination before they had a widespread 
effect on the quality of drug analysis, costing the state millions 
of dollars, and affecting many convicted and charged criminal 
defendants. 
The role of accreditation and certification in preventing 
situations of “bad apple” forensic scientists is more tenuous. A 
requirement that a scientist like Dookhan seek certification of 
her drug analysis skills through a body like the American 
Board of Criminalistics would have ensured that she was, at 
the least, subject to some education and an examination testing 
her knowledge of proper procedures.146 The problem is that 
scientists, like Dookhan, who skip proficiency testing, 
purposely contaminate samples, and produce test results 
without actually running analysis may do so even if 
competently trained and subject to lab regulations; a “bad 
apple” can just choose to ignore these rules and conduct testing 
as he or she sees fit. At the very least, though, having 
procedures and competency requirements makes it less likely 
that this blatant misconduct will occur due to greater oversight 
and education of scientists. 
The funding mechanisms of the Act would not only be 
ineffective in prompting state regulatory changes, but would 
fail to address how a general lack of funding for forensic 
laboratories has a negative impact on the work product and 
employee conduct at these facilities.147 As exemplified in St. 
Paul and Jamaica Plain, budgetary concerns may lead crime 
laboratories to forego accreditation and forensic scientists to 
cheat on their testing to deal with a backlog of cases and lack of 
other qualified personnel to adequately handle the work load. 
The Act’s appropriation of $10 million to aid facilities in 
seeking accreditation is helpful, but it, as noted above, is a drop 
in the bucket compared to total operating budgets of forensic 
laboratories.148 Furthermore, it is only a quarter of the $40 
million the Act appropriates for staff and operations of the 
various government agencies it would create.149 Without 
                                                          
 146. See supra text accompanying notes 26–28. 
 147. Cf. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 77 (concluding that the lack of 
resources for forensic laboratories leads to backlog, weaker evidence for trial, 
and lack of a knowledge base to underpin analysis and interpretation of 
evidentiary results). 
 148. See supra notes 135–37 and accompanying text. 
 149. Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132, 
112th Cong. § 104 (2011). 
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additional funding for these laboratories, how can they be 
expected to improve quality and cope with an ever-increasing 
caseload?150 The primary cause of both the St. Paul and the 
Jamaica Plain scandals was a lack of funding. At the former, a 
lack of funding led to a municipal decision not to seek 
accreditation;151 in the latter, a scientist trying to cope with a 
burgeoning backlog of cases fraudulently produced results.152 
Ultimately, budgeting money upfront to improve facilities and 
deal with caseload concerns may have prevented Minnesota 
and Massachusetts from now having to spend millions of 
dollars on resolving these incidents. 
Notably, neither of these examples concerns the processing 
of DNA evidence. DNA testing’s scientific integrity and 
reliability have led it to being considered the  “gold standard” 
in forensics.153 Laboratories performing such testing are, by 
and large, both well-funded and well-regulated, to the 
detriment of other types of forensic testing.154 Federal attempts 
at regulating forensic facilities performing DNA analysis have 
been able to appropriate more significant amounts of grant 
money to ensure compliance with standards and eliminate 
backlogs for DNA analysis.155 The Act  fails to do the same for 
other forensic disciplines like drug analysis. These disciplines 
are arguably even more in need of funding due to their 
widespread use in criminal prosecutions and need for further 
research, yet this piece of legislation fails to even place these 
disciplines on the same funding level as DNA analysis. 
The Act also fails to address other oversight methods, like 
state boards charged with investigating allegations of 
misconduct in labs. While accreditation standards may 
                                                          
 150. The Bureau of Justice Statistics crime lab census showed over 1.5 
million backlogged forensic service requests in 2009, an increase of over 
200,000 since 2008. See DUROSE ET AL., supra note 16, at 13 app. tbl.1. 
 151. See Baran, supra note 80 (noting the new budget for the St. Paul lab 
will be $1.5 million compared to the previous $800,000 annual budget for the 
lab). 
 152. See Reich, supra note 98, at 153–54 (reporting that a new bill before 
the U.S. Congress does not include backlogs). 
 153. Peterson & Leggett, supra note 15, at 654; id. at 646 (“By 2000, DNA 
evidence was uniformly accepted in courts all across the country.”). 
 154. See id. at 622 (“We pour resources into DNA typing but fail to devote 
the necessary funds to the collection and analysis of other types of evidence in 
crime laboratories.”). 
 155. See, e.g., 42 U.S.C. § 14136e (2006) (authorizing $5 million annually in 
grants to laboratories). 
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somewhat encompass this requirement by virtue of their 
regulation of lab procedures and proficiency testing, the 
purpose behind these oversight boards was to ensure a process 
was in place for external, independent investigations of lab 
misconduct.156 Thus, these boards remain governed by the 
Coverdell program. It has been established that these 
requirements are not being enforced by the DOJ,157 and serious 
problems remain with the boards that do exist. Both Minnesota 
and Massachusetts have oversight boards in place,158 and yet 
still experienced the aforementioned problems in their forensic 
laboratories. The problems in Minnesota emerged publically 
not from an investigation by its oversight board, but from the 
work of two public defenders representing defendants affected 
by the St. Paul crime lab’s conduct.159 The Jamaica Plain 
incident has been handled as an internal investigation by the 
state’s Department of Public Health and the state police force, 
and it is unknown whether the Massachusetts oversight board 
has gotten involved.160 Judging by the statutory language that 
created the board,161 the Massachusetts board would not have 
been able to process and investigate a complaint about 
Dookhan on its own.162 Obviously the boards are meant to be 
reactive, not proactive, but they need to be better-funded and 
given sufficient power to investigate misconduct in order to 
deter fraudulent activity like that of Annie Dookhan and poor 
lab management like that of the St. Paul forensic lab. 
B. IS REAL REFORM POSSIBLE? 
If the Criminal Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act 
cannot properly reform forensic science, is there any federal 
legislation that could? This section examines a few ways to 
improve upon this proposed legislation, and suggests possible 
effective alternatives to federal regulation.    Criminal justice 
                                                          
 156. 42 U.S.C.A. § 3797k (West 2012). 
 157. See INSPECTOR GENERAL REVIEW OF GRANTS PROGRAM, supra note 51, 
at 8. 
 158. MINN. STAT. § 299C.156 (2012); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 184A (2012). 
 159. Xiong, supra note 84, at B3. 
 160. See Ellement et al., supra note 92 (noting that the Department of 
Health conducted an internal investigation and the state police closed the lab 
after the investigation revealed the extent of the misconduct); Lavoie, supra 
note 96. 
 161. MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 6, § 184A (2012). 
 162. See id. (“The Board shall coordinate its responsibilities with the 
medico-legal investigation commission.”). 
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funding is an essential component to reforming the forensic 
science system, but is also a double-edged sword for federal 
legislation. An influx of funding to forensic laboratories for 
hiring, education, and improvement of facilities could go a long 
way toward ensuring forensic science is properly conducted.163 
With the current financial situation of many states, the federal 
government could be a good source for these funds. On the 
other hand, as the proposed funding increases, the barriers to 
passing the legislation multiply. The first barrier is that 
regulation of local criminal justice systems has traditionally 
been a prerogative of the states, and increased funding may be 
considered undue intrusion into state matters by Congress.164 A 
more general worry is that legislation with a significant 
funding component for forensic laboratories will not pass. For 
example, Senator Leahy was unable to move his Act out of the 
Senate Judiciary Committee for general consideration by the 
Senate,165 and that bill contained about $150 million in 
appropriations.166 Congress previously passed legislation with 
larger grants for facilities performing DNA analysis, but it 
remains to be seen whether these latest scandals and the 
recommendations of the NAS Report can motivate a more 
general and generous funding scheme for non-DNA forensic 
science testing.167 Focusing funding on DNA testing means that 
other forensic disciplines may get left behind—and the St. Paul 
and Jamaica Plain scandals illustrate that, with the amount of 
evidence processed via drug analysis, mistakes and misconduct 
can be costly to our criminal justice system. 
A key component of any effective federal legislation on this 
issue must include mandatory accreditation and certification 
standards enforced through a federal mechanism. By only 
carrying the threat of monetary sanctions if laboratories are 
                                                          
 163. See Cooley, supra note 31, at 446–47 (explaining the perennial 
underfunding of forensic science and that inadequate funding was a major 
factor in another crime lab debacle in Houston, Texas). 
 164. Cf. Goldstein, supra note 44, at 233–34 (arguing that states are better 
positioned to make reforms than the federal government since there can be 
benefits to state experimentation). 
 165. See supra notes 75–76 and accompanying text. 
 166. This number is based on my calculations of the fiscal components of 
the bill, as no congressional budget office estimate was released. Criminal 
Justice and Forensic Science Reform Act of 2011, S. 132, 112th Cong. §§ 104, 
305, 402; see also supra note 74 and accompanying text (describing the 
appropriations the Act would have created). 
 167. See supra notes 153–55 and accompanying text. 
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not in compliance, current and proposed federal regulations 
lack sufficient means to motivate states into compliance.168 
Congress should take a cue from its previous regulation of 
clinical service laboratories and apply similar measures to 
forensic science providers. This is not a new idea—it was 
proposed as far back as 1991169—long before the most recent 
lab scandals. The 1988 Clinical Laboratory Improvement 
Amendments (CLIA)170 ensured quality clinical laboratory 
testing in labs receiving Medicare or Medicaid payments, 
primarily by requiring laboratory accreditation through either 
the government or a certified outside agency.171 The difference 
between CLIA and regulations of forensic laboratories are the 
available sanctions: labs found in non-compliance with CLIA 
may be subject to a much wider range of sanctions by the 
government, including suspension of accreditation, a civil suit, 
imprisonment, or fines, for those found guilty of intentionally 
violating CLIA.172 
If strong sanctions such as these were coupled with the 
accreditation and certification requirements already present in 
the Act, it would likely increase the compliance of forensic labs. 
At the time of CLIA’s passage, similar legislation for forensic 
labs was unworkable due to a lack of standard operating 
procedures and certification for forensic professionals.173 With 
the creation of ASCLD/LAB accreditation and other types of 
standards, this is no longer the case. Guidelines exist for 
laboratory procedure and proper education of forensic scientists 
in the Act, and sanctions would then ensure that these 
guidelines are followed, minimizing both poor quality lab work 
and potential misconduct by bad actors. Nonetheless, these 
strict sanctions may ultimately be politically unpopular 
because actors in the criminal justice system are unwilling to  
 
 
                                                          
 168. See discussion supra Part II.A. 
 169. See Jonakait, supra note 11, at 178–90 (suggesting CLIA could serve 
as a framework for forensic science lab regulation). 
 170. Clinical Laboratory Improvement Amendments of 1988, 42 U.S.C. 
§ 263a (2006). 
 171. See A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 196 (quoting the Center for 
Medicare and Medicaid Services’ summary of provisions of the amendments). 
 172. Id. (listing the available sanctions and noting that the “list of all 
laboratories that have been sanctioned during the preceding year” is 
published). 
 173. Jonakait, supra note 11, at 180–81. 
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have labs completely shut down or have fines taken from public 
coffers for violations of these regulations.174 
If Congress is unable or unwilling to increase federal 
funding and improve enforcement of federal regulations, the 
current system of a largely state-by-state approach to 
managing forensic science facilities and personnel will 
continue. There are positives to this approach. States are better 
positioned to know the workings of their specific criminal 
justice systems, and can create regulations tailored to the 
situation of forensic laboratories in their jurisdictions.175 
However, such a patchwork system encourages inconsistency 
among the states, and further fragments a forensic science field 
that is in need of universal standards.176 The state-by-state 
system currently in place created the conditions allowing these 
scandals to occur, and the federal government is better-
positioned to provide the regulation and funding necessary to 
correct these errors and improve forensic science throughout 
the nation. 
CONCLUSION 
Since the publication of the NAS Report, there has been 
much discussion about how to address the problems and 
recommendations produced in the report. The problems with 
forensic laboratory procedures in Minnesota and with 
fraudulent analysts like Annie Dookhan in Massachusetts 
indicate that current federal and state regulations do not do 
enough to ensure that our forensic facilities are producing high-
quality testing results that the criminal justice system can 
depend on in making decisions of guilt or innocence for 
thousands of people. The Criminal Justice and Forensic Science 
Reform Act is one attempt at improving federal regulation of 
forensic science based on the NAS Report and the 
recommendations of stakeholders in the field. 
                                                          
 174. See id. at 182 (noting that forensic labs are more often directly funded 
with public money than clinical labs). 
 175. Goldstein, supra note 44, at 234 (“[F]ederal reform requires uniformity 
and ignores the benefits of state experimentation. It ignores geographic 
differences in values and the differences in the ways that states administer 
their systems of criminal justice and criminal investigation.” (footnote 
omitted)). 
 176. A PATH FORWARD, supra note 1, at 77 (“[T]he large amount of 
information provided to the committee . . . all points to a system that lacks 
coordination and that is underresourced . . . .”). 
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Unfortunately, the Act suffers from many of the same 
issues as past attempts at improving forensic science, at least 
regarding accreditation and certification standards for 
laboratories. Funding remains an issue at both the federal and 
state levels. In order to truly improve the conduct of forensic 
practitioners and the state of forensic facilities, laboratories 
need to be incentivized to implement standard procedures and 
hire educated, competent employees. Additionally, the 
oversight boards charged with investigating complaints of 
misconduct must have the tools and funding to do their job and 
police these laboratories. Without these measures, the scandals 
in St. Paul and Jamaica Plain will not be the last time that 
forensic mishaps make the headlines. 
 
